POLI 100B CONGRESS
9 February 2006

  1. The Spatial (Geometric) Model of Voting and Party Competition: Theory

    1. Assumptions:

      1. Legislators have Symmetric Single-Peaked Utility functions centered on their ideal points in the Policy Space.

      2. Legislators vote for the Policy Outcome Closest to them

    2. The number of Policy Dimensions needed to account for roll call voting in a Legislature is usually only 1 or 2 because of Constraint.

  2. Estimating Spatial (Geometric) Maps of Voting and Party Competition

    1. A Spatial (Geometric) Model of Roll Call Voting

      1. Each Legislator is represented by an ideal point and has a symmetric, single-peaked utility function centered at her ideal point over the policy space.

      2. Each Roll Call Vote is represented by Two points
        -- One Corresponding to the Yea Outcome -- Oy
        -- and One Corresponding to the Nay Outcome -- On.

      3. Legislators vote Probabilistically for the closest outcome:

        Probability of Yea = P[U(Oy) > U(On)]
        Probability of Nay = P[U(Oy) < U(On)]




    2. The 88th (1963-64) U.S. Senate -- Final Passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act



  3. The Polarization of American Politics

    1. Cloture Votes in the Senate



    2. Barack Obama's Big Mistake

    3. Barack Obama and John McCain Kiss and Make Up!

    4. John McCain Introduces Real Procedural Reform

    5. House Polarization vs Income Share Top 1 Percent



    6. House Polarization vs Percent Foreign Born



  1. Morris Fiorina's "Keystone" Argument -- Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment

    1. Democrats: 1946 - 2004 Seats vs. Votes



    2. Republicans: 1946 - 2004 Seats vs. Votes



    3. 1972 Mayhew Graph



    4. 1948 Mayhew Graph



    5. 1960 Mayhew Graph



    6. Presidential Coattails -- Unimodal Distribution



    7. Presidential Coattails -- Bimodal Distribution



    8. 1988 Mayhew Graph



    9. 1992 Mayhew Graph



    10. 2000 Mayhew Graph



    11. 2000 Gore Vote



    12. Percent Marginal Districts: 1946 - 1998



    13. House Incumbency Advantage



    14. Senate Incumbency Advantage



    15. Congressional Staff



    16. Committee Staff



    17. Pages in the Federal Register: 1936-2001



    18. Local-National Effects Midterm House Elections



    19. Local-National Effects Presidential Year House Elections



    20. Campaign Expenditures Congressional Elections



    21. Soft Money Congressional Elections



    22. Summary

  2. The Effect of Redistricting

    Fiorina rejected redistricting as an explanation of the "Vanishing Marginals" in his 1977 book but Cox and Katz in Elbridge Gerry's Salamander argue that redistricting was an important factor. Below is an example of why redistricting is important.

    Hypothetical State to be Redistricted
    First Republican Plan
    Second Republican Plan
    Democratic Plan