1. Constitutional Powers of Congress (Ch. 2 Stewart)
   
   
• Historical Origins
  
  
• Young Men of the Revolution: The Role of Nationalist Leaders.
  
  
• Table 2.2 p. 69 of Stewart.
  
  
• The U.S. Constitution
  
  
• Summary of Concepts, p. 82-83.
  
  
2. The Democrat-Republican Political Party System in Congress: 1879 - 2005
   
   A Competitive system until Great Depression. After 1930 Democratic Party was dominate until 1994 (Republicans won 1946 and 1952 elections, won Senate in 1980 elections).
   Congress: 1879 - 2005 Percent Democrat
   
   1960s - 1990s -- Republicans become dominate political party in the South (11 States of the Confederacy + KY + OK)
   House: 1879 - 2005 Percent Southern Seats Held by Republicans
   Senate: 1879 - 2005 Percent Southern Seats Held by Republicans
   House: 1879 - 2005 Percent Northern and Southern Seats Held by Republicans
   Senate: 1879 - 2005 Percent Northern and Southern Seats Held by Republicans
   
   
3. Changes in the Economy Since the Late 19^th Century
   
   Real GDP increases from 1.5 Trillion in 1947 to 11.0 Trillion in 2004
   U.S. Real GDP 1947 - 2004
   
   Real per capita GDP (the correct measure of economic improvement) increased from about $10,000 per capita in 1947 to about $34,000 in 2001.
   U.S. Real Per Capita GDP 1929 - 2004
   
   The business cycle has moderated substantially after WWII - recessions are not as sharp as they were before WWII. The Reagan and Clinton Booms were separated by only one year of slight (about -1%) negative growth.
   Percent Change in Real Per Capita GDP From Previous Year 1929 - 2004
   
   Unemployment rose from 3% in 1929 to a peak of 24.9% in 1933 - the Great Depression. It fell to about 14% in 1937 before President Roosevelt tried to balance the budget sending the economy back into recession. The economy recovered sharply between 1933 and 1937 - it is unclear how much of this was due to President Roosevelt's New Deal economic policies. Unemployment was clearly reduced by the works projects of the New Deal. The build-up to WWII produced strong economic growth 1938-1941 and by 1941 unemployment was down to 9% (still a very high level compared to the 1920s). Since the end of WWII overall unemployment has never gone above 10%. Non-White Unemployment has been consistently higher than White unemployment - a difference of around 5%. During the Clinton economic boom non-White unemployment dropped faster than White unemployment.
   Unemployment (Yearly): 1929 - 2004
   Unemployment (Quarterly): 1948 - 2005
   
   Big spikes during both World Wars. Deflation during the Great Depression. Slow increase in inflation from 1964 to its peak in 1979 - inflation and high rate of unemployment - stagflation - made President Carter a one term President. Sharp decline under Reagan and continuing slow decline under Clinton.
   Inflation Rate: 1914 - 2005
   
   Since the 1950s there has been a tremendous increase in the labor force participation of women.
   Labor Force Participation: 1955 - 2004
   
   The percentage of foreign born fell after immigration was cut off in 1924. After the Immigration Act of 1965 immigration (legal and illegal) greatly increased so that the foreign born percentage has now risen to about the level of the 1920s.
   Foreign Born: 1800 - 2004
   
   Big increase in Unionization during the 1930s after the Wagner Act of 1935 (NLRA - National Labor Relations Act). NLRA guaranteed the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively. Set up the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to hold supervised elections among employees when there was a dispute over which union should represent them. Slow decline since 1960.
   Union Membership: 1930 - 2004
   
   Income Inequality - Series mirrors labor union series. 1913 Income Tax Amendment passed. 1916 Estate Tax Passed. High rates during WWI. Tax cuts under Harding & Coolidge. During the early period before the Great Depression, income was mostly from wealth holdings - income from dividends. High taxes during Great Depression and WWII - 1944 91% top marginal rate. Reagan Tax cuts. Increased under President Clinton. Currently, 80% is Wage and Entrepreneurial Income, only 20% Capital Income (many stocks do not pay dividends!).
   Top 1% Income Share: 1913 - 1998
   
   Wealth Held by Top 1%: 1922-1998. Net Worth: the current value of all marketable assets. Augmented Wealth: Marketable Wealth and Pension Wealth (including Social Security)
   Wealth Held by Top 1%: 1922 - 1998
   
   By the End of WW II the USA was very egalitarian – only 2.5% of families had an income exceeding $60,000 in 1997 Dollars. By 1973 this was 26% and by 1996 it was 30%. By 1980 the top Marginal Rates on $135,000, $67,000, $33,000 were 59%, 49%, and 28% respectively. In 1991 the corresponding rates were 31%, 28%, 28%.
   Top Marginal Income Tax Rate: 1913 - 2003
   
   Real Minimum Taxable Estate in 2002$$ (note that the LOWER this is on the axis the HIGHER the taxes) and the Maximum Estate Tax Rate. This has tracked the top marginal income tax rate.
   Estate Tax Rate: 1916 - 2010
   
   The Lorenz Curve and the Gini Index are Measures of Income Inequality across a defined population.
   Lorenz Curve: U.S. 1994
   
   The Gini Index For families by Race - Inequality Has Been Increasing Since the Middle 1960s. The rates are higher for Blacks and Hispanics - that is, inequality within each group is higher than for Whites. Trends began before Reagan, accelerated in the 1980s with some leveling off in the 1990s. Note that during the Clinton boom the gini indexes for all three groups have gotten closer together!
   Gini Index: 1947 - 2000
   
   Increasing Returns to Education since the 1970s may be playing a role in increasing inequality. Computer hardware and software requires more highly educated people – hence, increasing income returns to education.
   High School Graduation Rates: 1910 - 1995
   Returns to High School and College Education: 1915 - 1995
   
   If income inequality is increasing, how could it be that home ownership is increasing? Note the drop during the Great Depression then the Huge Jump from 1940 to 1950 (Housing Tracts, etc.). Another big jump from 1950 to 1960, then a leveling off. Flat during the 1970s with a slight decline during the early 1980s. Takes off during the Clinton boom.
   Home Ownership: 1900 - 2001
   
   Possible Explanation - Increasing Inequality occurring during huge increase in wealth (real per capita GDP has doubled from 1960s to late 1990s). Could it be the case that the real prices of goods have fallen faster than we realize and real wages have risen faster than we realize. A good example of this is the price of light!
   Price of Light: 1800 - 1992
   
   
4. The Spatial Model of Voting and Party Competition (Ch. 1 Stewart; Chs. 1, 2, 3, 4 P&R)
   
   Hotelling's store location problem - assume houses strung out along the street. Assume the two stores offer identical service, etc. Assume the people always shop at the closest store (what does "closest" mean here??? A: DISTANCE - i.e., walking distance). Solution - The point that minimizes the sum of the walking distances of the n residents is the solution -- The Median.
   Figure 1.1 (Stewart): Competition for Customers Between Two Shop Owners
   
   Assume the citizens vote for the candidate closest to them. Assume the candidates can take any policy position (ignore "crossing-over" problem). Solution - the median voter.
   Figure 1.2 (Stewart): Competition for Two Candidates for Votes
   
   Assume the legislators vote for the policy closest to them. Assume that legislator ideal points are fixed. Note that if you allow the legislators to offer amendments a policy located at the median committee member's ideal point always wins.
   Figure 1.3 (Stewart): Voting in a Committee over Two Minimum Wage Proposals, X and Y
   
   What does "closest" mean? Utility - how much pleasure/satisfaction a voter/legislator gets from a particular policy (concept from Economics). Utility is a maximum at the voter/legislator's ideal point and then declines as you move away from the ideal point in any direction - This is known as SINGLE-PEAKED utility/preferences. Quadratic Utility function - Utility = a - b(distance between ideal point and policy)**2.
   Figure 1.4 (Stewart): Quadratic Utility Function
   
   Utility and Preferences are interchangeable concepts in most of what we do because we assume that people prefer more utility (closer outcome) to less utility (outcome further away). Normal Distribution Utility Function - Not much in tails. Helps explain behavior of extremists.
   Figure 2.2 (Poole and Rosenthal) Normal Distribution Utility Function
   
   Examples of Two Dimensional Quadratic Utility Functions.
   Figure 1.10 (Stewart): Two Dimensional Quadratic Utility Function
   Two Dimensional Quadratic Utility Function (Ordeshook)
   
   A "Contour Map" of a Two Dimensional Utility Function. Looking down on it like a contour map of a mountain - the curves trace out the same height - these are known as indifference curves.
   Indifference Curves Over Two Issue Dimensions
   Figure 1.11 (Stewart): Examples of Indifference Curves
   
   The Two Dimensional Normal Distribution Utility Function.
   Bivariate Normal Utility Function
   
   Roll Call Voting on One Basic Dimension -- How issue mappings occur.
   Figure 2.3 (Poole and Rosenthal) Voting in One Dimension
   
   Roll Call Voting on Two Basic Dimensions -- How issue mappings occur.
   Figure 2.4 (Poole and Rosenthal) Constraint Example in Two Dimensional Space
   
   A Spatial (Geometric) Model of Roll Call Voting: Each Legislator is represented by an ideal point and has a symmetric, single-peaked utility function centered at her ideal point over the policy space. Each Roll Call Vote is represented by Two points
   -- One Corresponding to the Yea Outcome -- O_y and One Corresponding to the Nay Outcome -- O_n. Legislators vote Probabilistically for the closest outcome:
   Probability of Yea = P[U(O_y) > U(O_n)]
   Probability of Nay = P[U(O_y) < U(O_n)]
   A Spatial (Geometric) Model of Roll Call Voting
   
   
5. The Ideological Structure of Congressional Voting (Ch. 1 Stewart; Chs. 1, 2, 3, 4, P&R)
   
   The Basic Space is Two Dimensional - Economic Issues, "Social" Issues. No coherent underlying philosophy - Democrats less regulation on social issues more regulation on economic issues - Republicans just the opposite. GUN CONTROL! Pushed by Democrats - it does not "fit" with the usual social issues like Abortion, Gay Rights, etc.
   The Basic Space of American Politics
   
   From the end of Reconstruction until the late 1930s congressional voting was essentially one dimensional. Beginning in the 1930s an important 2^nd dimension appeared that picked up the division within the Democratic party over Civil Rights for Blacks. The clear division of the Democrats into Northern and Southern parties can be seen in the spatial separation of the "S" and "D" tokens. After the mid-1970s this division gradually disappears and voting is once again largely one dimensional. A very important feature that the animated gifs show is that the same forces are at work on both chambers. The two scalings are completely separate but the voting structures in the two chambers are exactly the same. The Big Story of the past 40 years - The realignment of the South into the Republican Party - it now has peaked.
   Animated Gif for the 46^th to the 105^th Congresses
   
   
6. The Polarization of the Congressional Parties (Chs. 1, 2, 3, D&O; Ch. 4, P&R)
   
   House Polarization Over History. The first graph shows a smoothed histogram of the 93^rd House versus the 108^th House. The parties have pulled apart and the leadership tends to be from the left/right sides of the respective party.
   The 93^rd versus the 108^th House
   
   The Party Means show the trends noted above: From the end of Reconstruction until the late 1930s congressional voting was essentially one dimensional. Beginning in the 1930s an important 2^nd dimension appeared that picked up the division within the Democratic party over Civil Rights for Blacks.
   House Party Means on the First Dimension 1879 - 2004
   House Party Means on the Second Dimension 1879 - 2004
   
   Below are the distances between the two Party Means since the end of Reconstruction. Polarization fell from World War I through the 1970s and has dramatically risen since. It is now almost the same level that it was 100 years ago. The trends in the two chambers are nearly the same.
   House and Senate Polarization 1879 - 2004
   House and Senate Party Unity Scores 1879 - 2004
   
   "Move the Previous Motion" rule allows a vote to end debate - accidentally left out of Senate Rules in 1806 - Hence Debate could be unlimited!!!! FILIBUSTER. Only after a "small group of willful men" (Woodrow Wilson's term) filibustered the League of Nations Treaty in 1919 did the Senate adopt the first version of Rule 22. Rule 22 - 2/3 Present and Voting can end debate - CLOTURE MOTION. 7 March 1975 changed to 3/5 total Senate (60 Votes). Effects - (Sinclair essay in Congress Reconsidered) - More Unanimous Consent Agreements. HOLDS - Threats to object to a Unanimous Consent Agreement - Results in much behind-the-scenes negotiation between Senators favoring a particular bill and those Senators who have filed "Holds" on the bill. NON-GERMANE Amendments - Can offer other pieces of legislation as amendments to a bill on the floor - Majority Leader can make a Motion to Table - Nondebatable - But Majority Leader's party members then HAVE TO VOTE!
   Cloture Votes in the Senate: 1919 - 2001
   
   
7. Morris Fiorina, The Mystery of the Vanishing Marginals, and the (Un)Vanishing Marginals (ch. 7 D&O)
   
   Note that Total Vote Percentages does not translate linearly into House Seats.
   Democrats: 1946 - 2004 Seats vs. Votes
   Republicans: 1946 - 2004 Seats vs. Votes
   
   Bimodal Distribution in 1972
   1972 Mayhew Graph
   
   Unimodal Distribution before the 1960s
   1948 Mayhew Graph
   1960 Mayhew Graph
   
   The importance of marginal districts -- Presidential Coattails!
   Presidential Coattails -- Unimodal Distribution
   Presidential Coattails -- Bimodal Distribution
   
   More Recent Graphs -- Some bimodality in 1988, very little in 1992
   1988 Mayhew Graph
   1992 Mayhew Graph
   2000 Gore Vote
   
   The fraction of Marginal Districts declined 1960 - 1984 - during period that Fiorina wrote about. The fraction then turned up after 1984 but BIG VARIANCE!
   Percent Marginal Districts: 1946 - 1998
   
   Incumbency Advantage clearly increased after 1960 - the culprit that Fiorina fingered for the cause of the "Vanishing Marginals" Sophomore Surge - Increase in vote percentage from first election to second election (technically, the average). Retirement Slump - Average change of party's percentage in the district from last election of retiring incumbent to percentage garnered by retiring incumbent's party's candidate. The two measures both change sharply after 1960 (graphs end in 1990!). The Senate effects are not as dramatic.
   House Incumbency Advantage
   Senate Incumbency Advantage
   
   The Evidence: Increases in Congressional Staff. Note huge jump after WWII then leveling off. The big rise was just before Keystone came out in 1977. This can be Hill staff + District Office Staff. Committee Staff a. Committee staff story the same as overall staff.
   Congressional Staff
   Committee Staff
   
   The Evidence: Pages in the Federal Register.
   Pages in the Federal Register: 1936-2001
   
   The Change After the 1980s -- Everyone Uses the "Casework Style". National Forces Reassert Themselves.
   Local-National Effects Midterm House Elections
   Local-National Effects Presidential Year House Elections
   
   Fiorina: The Money Did it!
   Campaign Expenditures Congressional Elections
   Soft Money Congressional Elections
   
   Summary
   Summary of the Keystone Argument
   
   
8. The Importance of Redistricting
   
   Fiorina rejected redistricting as an explanation of the "Vanishing Marginals" in his 1977 book but Cox and Katz in Elbridge Gerry's Salamander argue that redistricting was an important factor. Below is an example of why redistricting is important.
   Hypothetical State to be Redistricted
   First Republican Plan
   Second Republican Plan
   Democratic Plan
   
   
9. Congressional Elections -- Turnout and Trust
   
   Note that Total Vote Percentages does not translate linearly into House Seats.
   Democrats: 1946 - 2004 Seats vs. Votes
   Republicans: 1946 - 2004 Seats vs. Votes
   
   Midterm Loss of Seats (Stewart Table 4.3) - Percent of 2-party vote that the President's party got in the Presidential election year and the next off-year election - note that it is always positive. Democrats gained seats in 1998 for the first time since 1934.
   Midterm Loss of Seats by the President's Party
   
   Turnout 1930 - 2004 - Always lower in "off-year" elections. Even during Presidential years, several percent of the public vote for President but not for the House!! Also note that turnout peaked 40 years ago! Slight upticks in 1984, 1992, 2000, and 2004 but the general trend was downward until 2000.
   Turnout (Voting Age) 1930 - 2000
   
   Turnout (Eligible) 1788 - 2004 - Peaked period through the Civil War - declined from the 1890s until the 1920s - bumped up briefly after women were added to the electorate - bumped up again after WWII and peaked in 1960, and then fell only to rise in 2004.
   Turnout 1788 - 2004
   
   Trust in Government 1952 - 2004
   Trust in Government: 1952 - 2004
   
   Trust in Government (new Series from ICPSR) - Different Methodology -- 1958 - 2004
   Trust in Government
   
   Table 5.3 (Stewart) - Attitudes and Turnout.
   The Relationship Between Attitudes Toward the U.S. and Voter Turnout in the 1994 Congressional Elections
   
   Figure 5.2 (Stewart) - Variation in Turnout Among House Districts - 1994 (Low) vs. 1996 (High)
   Variation in Turnout Among House Districts, 1994 and 1996
   
   Figure 5.3 (Stewart) - Turnout and Winning Percentage of the Vote - House Elections 1994 and 1996
   Turnout and Winning Percentage of the Vote, House Elections, 1994 and 1996
   
   
10. Congressional Elections -- Voters, Candidates, and Issues
    
    Figure 4-2 (Erikson and Wright) - Partisanship and Seat Shares - Note that they roughly track but we need to factor in turnout.
    Democratic Seats and Vote Share, 1946 - 2002
    
    Figure 4-3 (Erikson and Wright) - Spending Preferences from NPAT surveys: 2002 and 1998
    Spending Preferences for Democratic and Republican Congressional Candidates, 1998 and 2002
    
    Figure 4-4 (Erikson and Wright) - Issue differences by party. Note how all these spending and issue positions are correlated.
    Party Differences Among House Candidates on Selected Issues, 1998 and 2002
    
    Figure 4-5 (Erikson and Wright) - Distribution of Candidate Ideology by Party, 2002 and 1998.
    Party Candidate Ideological Differences, 1998 and 2002
    
    With Respect to Figure 4-4 and 4-5 (Erikson and Wright), recall the discussion of The Basic Space and The Mapping of Issues
    The Basic Space and Issue Mappings
    
    Figure 4-6 (Erikson and Wright) - Incumbency advantage - horizontal axis 1996 Clinton (2000 Gore) Vote, vertical axis 1998 (2002) House Vote
    The Incumbency Advantage in the House, 1998 and 2002
    
    (Recall) Incumbency Advantage: Sophomore Surge and Retirement Slump
    The Incumbency Advantage in the House, 1846 - 2000
    
    Table 4-1 (Erikson and Wright) - Quality of Challengers 2002 and 1998
    Incumbents Facing Quality Challengers in the 1998 and 2002 House Elections
    
    Figure 4-7 (Erikson and Wright) - Ideology by Presidential Vote - Note that this has both candidates from NPAT
    Republican and Democratic 1998 (2002) Candidate Ideology by District Presidential Vote in 1996 (2000)
    
    Figure 4-8 (Erikson and Wright) - Ideology and the House Vote - Note that the "M"s should be clustered around 50% Clinton Vote
    Ideology and the House Vote, 1998 and 2002
    
    Figure 4-9 (Erikson and Wright) - Note "S" Shape. These are winners regardless of party
    Winner's Ideology by District Presidential Vote, 2002 and 1998
    
    Table 4-3 (Erikson and Wright) - How Voters Perceive the Candidates
    Voter's Perceptions of the Ideology of their Representative: 1978 - 2002
    
    
11. Voter Choices
    
    Table 5.2 (Stewart) - Probability of Voting as a Function of House Candidate Evaluations
    Table 5.2 -- Probability of Voting as a Function of House Candidate Evaluations, 1994
    
    Table 5.4 (Stewart) - Party and Ideological Distance as Explanatory Factors in House Elections
    Party and Ideological Distance as Factors in House Elections in 1994
    
    Table 5.5 (Stewart) - Ideological Extremity of Voters in 1994, by Interest in Politics
    Ideological Extremity and Interest in Politics
    
    Figure 5.6 (Stewart) - Richard Fenno's Concept of Nested Constituencies
    The Nested Constituencies of a Member of Congress
    
    
12. Progressive Ambition
    
    State and Federal Hierarchy of Offices
    State Hierarchy: Governor > State Legislator > Local Official
    Federal Hierarchy: President > Senator > Representative
    
    Table 4.1 (Stewart) - MA Example of Progressive Ambition
    Prior Careers of the MA Delegation to the House, 91^st Congress (1969-71)
    
    Table 4.4 (Stewart) - Low and High Quality challengers
    Success of High and Low Quality Challengers in 1994
    
    
13. Campaign Spending
    
    Campaign Spending By Winning House Candidates
    Campaign Spending by Winning House Candidates: 1976 - 2004
    
    Campaign Spending By Winning Senate Candidates
    Campaign Spending by Winning Senate Candidates: 1976 - 2004
    
    The Cost to Defeat a House Incumbent, 1984 - 2000
    House Challengers Who Beat Incumbents
    
    Spending on House and Senate Campaigns: 1982 - 2002 (Real Dollars)
    Total Spending on House and Senate Campaigns
    
    Soft Money Receipts by Party: 1992 - 2002 (Real Dollars)
    Soft Money in Real Dollars
    
    Gini Coefficient for Individual Campaign Contributions: 1980 - 2002
    Unequal Giving to Congressional Campaigns
    
    PAC Contributions by Ideology, 2002. L = Labor, C = Corporate, T = Trade, N = Unconnected, U = Unknown, V = Cooperative, W = Corporation Without Stock
    PAC Contributions by Ideology
    
    Recent Origins of the Current Mess: Buckley vs. Valeo, 1976
    Bukley vs Valeo -- What the Supreme Court Did
    
    McCain-Feingold -- Contribution Limits
    Contribution Limits under McCain-Feingold
    
    McCain-Feingold -- Spending Limits
    Spending Limits under McCain-Feingold
    
    McCain-Feingold -- Impact on Open-Seat Candidate Receipts
    Open-Seat Receipts
    
    McCain-Feingold -- Impact on Democrat/Republican Candidate Receipts
    Democrat and Republican Candidate Receipts
    
    McCain-Feingold -- Impact on Individual Contributions to House Candidates
    Individual Contributions to House Candidates
    
    McCain-Feingold -- Impact on Party Fund Raising
    Party Fund Raising
    
    Figure 6.9 (Stewart) -- Why Incumbents Love the System (even after McCain-Feingold)
    Spending Advanage of Incumbents
    
    
14. The Importance of Voting Rules
    
    The Choice of Voting Scheme Can Change the Outcome
    Voting in the Roman Senate
    
    The Voting Order Can Change the Outcome
    The Paradox of Voting (Condorcet Paradox)
    
    Whether or Not Voters vote in Accord with their True Preferences Can Change the Outcome (Sophisticated vs. Sincere Voting)
    The Powell Amendment
    
    Controlling the Agenda Can Change the Outcome
    Richard McKelvey's "Chaos" Theorem
    
    Gerry Mackie: None of these are Serious Problems in the Real World
    
    
15. How a Bill Becomes a Law
    
    Overview of the Process
    Inside the Sausage Factory -- How a Bill Becomes a Law
    
    Figure 9.1 (Stewart) - Number of Bills Introduced
    Bills Introduced in and Passed by Congress, 1947 - 1988
    
    Table 9.1 (Stewart) -- Hurdles in the Process
    Legislative Hurdles
    
    Table 9.2 (Stewart) -- Rules Committee: Open, Closed, and Special Rules
    Special Rules in the House
    
    Table 9.3 (Stewart) -- Daily Order of Business
    Daily Order of Business in the House and Senate, 106^th House
    
    Figure 9.5 (Stewart) -- The Full House Floor Voting Tree
    Two Views of the House Amendment Tree
    
    
16. The Committee System
    
    House and Senate Committees in the 107^th Congress. Note the sizes of the House Committees and how Subcommittees "chop up" the jurisdictions. The Party Ratios on the Committees are very close to the overall party ratio of the House. The Senate Committee system roughly parallels the House albeit with much closer party ratios.
    The Committee System in the 109^th Congress
    
    Table 8.1 (Stewart) -- The Types of Congressional Committees
    A Morphology of Congressional Committees
    
    Table 8.2 (Stewart) - Jurisdictions of the Ways & Means and Senate Finance Committees (Remember the Constitution!)
    Jurisdiction of the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee in the 106^th Congress
    
    Figure 8.1 (Stewart) -- History of Committees - The Number of Committees Over Time - Note the slow rise of Standing Committees into the 20th Century. This corresponds to the growth of Industrial Capitalism
    The Number of Committees in the House and Senate, 1789 - 1998
    
    Figure 8.2 (Stewart) - Party Ratios over time on the Taxing Committees - Unless the majority party has a super-large majority, it has a bigger majority on the taxing committees - that is a measure of How Important they are.
    Percentage of Seats Held by the Majority Party on House and Senate Taxing Committees
    
    Table 8.7 (Stewart) - Committee Rankings based upon transfer patterns. The Pecking Order - The Prestige Hierarchy!
    Relative Attractiveness Ranking of House and Senate Committees, 81^st to 102^nd Congresses
    
    
17. Pivots and Gridlock Intervals
    
    Example of Veto Pivot, Filibuster Pivot, and Gridlock Interval